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HOME IS WHERE THE HEART IS: DETERMINING THE STANDARD FOR
HABITUAL RESIDENCE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION BASED ON A CHILDCENTRIC APPROACH
I.

Introduction
There’s no place like home—but what happens when an individual is removed from the

only home they have ever known? Familial child snatching is a widespread problem wreaking
havoc with the law. 1 The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction 2 (“Hague Convention”) provides for the immediate return of children who are
unlawfully removed from their country of habitual residence. 3 The Hague Convention was
drafted as a response to the problem of estranged parents wrongfully taking a child across
international borders from one signatory4 nation to another, and provides for the child’s prompt
return to the appropriate forum.5 Under Article 12, when a child who is a habitual resident of
one signatory state is unlawfully6 removed to another signatory state, the latter must order the
return of the child.7 While aiming to provide a standard for quickly and efficiently returning the
child in question to his or her country of habitual residence, the Hague Convention has proven to

1

For a chart reflecting the number of international parental abduction cases reported to the United States Central
Authority in 2012, see http://travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/english/legal/compliance/statistics.html.
2
As of 2013, there are 90 contracting states to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction. See http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.statusprint&cid=24.
3
Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, 19 I.L.M. 1501 (1980).
4
A signatory state is a state that contracts to “commit to have in place judicial and administrative remedies for the
return of children taken from the State of their habitual residence to another signatory State in violation of the leftbehind parent’s custody rights under the law of the State of the child's habitual residence.” See Redmond v.
Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. 2013).
5
The Hague Convention does not define “habitual residence,” but courts have been instructed to interpret the phrase
according to “the ordinary and natural meaning of the two words it contains [, as] a question of fact to be decided
by reference to all the circumstances of any particular case.” C v S, 2 All E.R. 961, 965 (Eng.H.L. 1990).
6
See infra Part III.
7
Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report ¶¶ 11, 13, & 16 in 3 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Acts
and Documents of the Fourteenth Session, Child Abduction 426 (1982).

be an impediment rather than a solution to the problem. Because the courts have been left to
formulate their own standards, a split in the federal circuit courts has emerged. The Third, Sixth,
and Eighth Circuits have shaped a standard that focuses on the objective signs of a child’s
acclimatization, while the Second and Ninth Circuits have adopted a standard that focuses on the
parents’ last shared subjective intentions to determine the child’s habitual residence.8
In its recent decision in Redmond v. Redmond,9 the Seventh Circuit illustrated how sharp
the divide truly is among the circuits regarding the standard that should be used in determining
habitual residence. 10 Redmond involved a father who filed a Hague Convention petition 11
claiming that the mother wrongfully retained their child in the United States. Although the
parents initially agreed that their son would be raised in Ireland, the Seventh Circuit held that, for
purposes of the Hague Convention, his habitual residence was Illinois.12 He was born in Illinois,
and with the exception of seven and half months of his infancy, he lived there and maintained
frequent contact with family members, received recurrent care from Illinois doctors, attended
school, and established many friendships in the area.13 The Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court’s holding that Ireland was the child’s habitual residence.14 The district court’s decision
was problematic because it considered the parents’ “last shared intent” about where the child

8

Compare Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993), Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 (3d
Cir. 1995), and Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2010), with Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1069
(9th Cir. 2001), and Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 2005).
9
724 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2013).
10
See id. at 744.
11
In order to file a Hague Convention petition, the first step is to contact the country officer assigned to the child’s
case and determine what options are available. It is important to submit a Hague petition as soon as practicable
following an abduction or wrongful retention. A custody order is not necessary in order to file a petition. The Hague
petition form should be filled out and submitted with the requisite supporting documentation. Before submitting the
petition, it is recommended that individuals consult with an attorney. Once submitted, the petitioner should stay in
close contact with the appropriate country officer. For information on downloading a Hague Convention petition,
see http://travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/english/from/hague-app.html.
12
Redmond, 724 F.3d at 732.
13
See id. at 743.
14
Id. at 732.
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would live as a dispositive factor.15 The district court failed to consider the child’s perspective
and disregarded what a child in his position would have viewed as his habitual residence. 16 The
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the district court erred because it wrongly treated the parents’
last shared intent as a fixed doctrinal test, rather than focusing on the child’s perspective and
acclimatization to the United States.17
In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit stated, “conventional wisdom thus recognizes a split
between the circuits” that follow a standard focusing on the parents’ perspectives and “those that
use a more child-centric approach.” 18 The court asserted, “in substance, all circuits—ours
included—consider both parental intent and the child’s acclimatization, differing only in their
emphasis.”19 Redmond appropriately illustrates the current problem because it demonstrates that
the essence of the disagreement between the circuits is how much weight to give parental intent
versus the child’s perspective.20
The establishment of habitual residence is a critical threshold determination in Hague
Convention proceedings. This note argues that courts should adopt a hybrid subjective and
objective reasonable person standard focusing on the child’s perspective and past experience.
The Hague Convention provides a legal process for countries to work together on international
parental child abduction cases. In order for the Hague Convention to even apply, the child must
have been habitually resident in one signatory country, and wrongfully removed to or retained in
another signatory country.21 Courts in children’s habitual residences are in the best position to
make custody determinations and therefore it is a priority to ensure that they return there. Part II
15

Id. at 744.
Id.
17
Id. at 746–47.
18
Redmond, 724 F.3d at 745.
19
See id. at 746.
20
Id.
21 Perez-Vera, supra note 7, at ¶ 11.
16
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of this note examines the history of the Hague Convention and highlights its central purpose.
Part III discusses when the Hague Convention applies, and introduces the vagueness of the
habitual residence determination. Part IV analyzes the variant approaches of the circuit courts,
including both the child-centric and parental intent models, and examines the case law leading up
to Redmond. Finally, Part V argues that a single standard for determining habitual residence is
imperative to fulfill the fundamental goals of the Hague Convention. This note proposes that a
hybrid subjective and objective standard focusing on which country a reasonable person in the
situation would view as their habitual residence would most effectively adhere to both the spirit
and the letter of the Hague Convention’s stated purpose.
II.

History and Purpose of the Hague Convention
Adopted in 1980, the Hague Convention intends to prevent parents from fleeing

internationally with their children in the hopes of receiving a favorable custody determination in
a more amenable jurisdiction. 22 While at first glance one might assume that the Hague
Convention, a treaty which includes terms like “abduction” and “force,” was composed as a
response to concern regarding forceful kidnappings by strangers, that is far from the case. 23 On
the contrary, it was drafted as a response to the unilateral and wrongful removal or retention of
children by a parent, guardian, or other family member.24 Those who seek to remove a child
from one country to another in these situations often attempt to attain physical and legal care and
custody over the child, usually related to them, in the new jurisdiction.25

22

Perez-Vera, supra note 7, at ¶ 11.
See Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001).
24
Id. at 1069–70.
25
Id. at 1070.
23
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Signatory states to the Hague Convention 26 commit to protect children from the
deleterious effects of their wrongful removal or retention, which occur after they are displaced
from the family and social environment in which they have developed. 27 Still, the Hague
Convention is more than that. A primary objective of the Hague Convention is to maintain the
existing state of affairs and allow the country with the greatest connection to the child to make
decisions about the child’s custodial arrangement and future.28 When a court determines that a
particular country is the child’s habitual residence, the court should order that the child be
immediately returned, unless certain exceptions apply. 29

The return of the child is not

necessarily required if the petitioner was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of
removal or retention, if the petitioner consented to the removal or retention, if the child objects to
being returned and has reached an age of maturity, or if returning the child to the country of
habitual residence would pose a serious threat of physical or psychological harm to the child or
violate human rights.30 Thus, the determination of a child’s habitual residence has a profound
and enduring impact on the child.
III.

Applying the Hague Convention: The Ambiguity of the Habitual Residence Factor
In order for the return remedy to apply under the Hague Convention, a child’s removal or

retention must be found to be wrongful under the treaty. A showing of wrongful removal or
retention hinges upon demonstrating two requirements.31 Article 3 states in pertinent part:
[T]he removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where

26

Hague Convention on Private International Law: Final Act, 19 I.L.M. 1501 (1980).
Perez-Vera, supra note 7, at ¶ 11.
28
See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 20 (2010).
29
Hague Convention, art. 13, 19 I.L.M. at 1501
30
Id.
31
Hague Convention, art. 3, 19 I.L.M. at 1501
27
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a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any
other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child
was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and
b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either
jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or
retention.32
As a caveat, Article 4 provides that the Hague Convention applies to a child who habitually
resided in a signatory state immediately before any breach of custody or access rights, as long as
the child is under the age of 16.33
Once it is clear that the Hague Convention is applicable to a particular situation, courts
generally employ a four-part test to resolve the issues stemming from Article 3.34 First, a court
must ask when the removal or retention at issue took place. 35 Next, it should analyze the
circumstances directly prior to the removal or retention to discern which country was the child’s
habitual residence. 36 After further examination to see whether “the removal or retention
breach[ed] the rights of custody 37 attributed to the petitioner under the law of habitual
residence,”38 the court must decide whether the petitioner was “exercising those rights at the time
of the removal or retention.”39 The crux of the problem lies in the second question of a Hague
Convention analysis – determining the state of “habitual residence.” The Hague Convention
itself neither defines nor elaborates on the term “habitual residence.” Minimal case law exists
32

Hague Convention, art. 3, 19 I.L.M. at 1501.
Hague Convention, art. 4, 19 I.L.M. at 1501.
34
See Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 2001).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
An example of breaching custody rights would be if one parent sought sole custody over a child outside the
habitual residence and thus disregarded the rights of the other parent, protected by law, and interfered with their
normal exercise. See Perez-Vera, supra note 7, at ¶ 11.
38
Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1070.
39
Id.
33
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regarding the interpretation of the Hague Convention, and cases that do address it fail to provide
concrete guidance on the meaning of the term “habitual residence.” 40 As recognized in
Redmond, the circuits are currently split regarding the appropriate standard to be used. This split
has its roots in the disagreement over what factors should be considered in determining a child’s
habitual residence, and the weight to be given to the parents’ and child’s perspectives. Because
“[t]he Hague Convention is generally intended to restore the pre-abduction status quo and to
deter parents from crossing borders in search of a more sympathetic court,”41 the determination
of habitual resident is essential.
IV. The Variant Approaches of the Circuit Courts
This part of the note will analyze the different approaches the circuits take in conducting
habitual residence determinations. Generally, the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have shaped a
standard that stresses the importance of focusing on the child’s perspective, while the Second
and Ninth Circuits have formulated a standard that emphasizes the parents’ last shared intentions.
A. The Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits: The Child’s Perspective
The majority of the circuits tasked with interpreting the proper test for habitual residence
under the Hague Convention have explicitly recognized the primacy of the child’s point of view.
When determining which country is the child’s habitual residence, these circuits approach the
inquiry by focusing on the child’s perspectives and past experience, and place significantly less
weight on, and occasionally disregard, the parent’s intentions and future plans. These cases
highlight the notion that focusing on the parents’ shared intent at the time the child was born
40

In Abbott v. Abbott, the Court looked at other countries’ interpretation of the Hague Convention, but noted that
while Congress has instructed that a uniform interpretation is inherent in the Convention’s framework, the Court
“should not substitute the judgment of other courts for our own.” See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 42 (2010). The
Court also stated: “[W]hile we should give respectful consideration to the interpretation of an international treaty
rendered by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret such, it has been recognized in international law that,
absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the
implementation of the treaty in that State.” Id. (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998)).
41
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993).
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sheds little light on the question of the child’s habitual residence at the time of the alleged
wrongful removal, which often occurs years later.
The Sixth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to determine whether the unilateral
removal of a child from one country to another by a parent was “wrongful.” In its 1993 decision
Friedrich v. Friedrich, one of the earliest applications of the Hague Convention in the United
States, the Sixth Circuit heard the case of Emanuel Friedrich, who appealed the denial of his
petition for the return of his son, Thomas, to Germany.42 Thomas’s mother, Jeana Friedrich,
removed him from Germany to the United States days after the couple separated without either
Emanuel’s knowledge or consent.43
Acknowledging that the Hague Convention fails to define “habitual residence,” 44 the
court noted that no United States cases supplied guidance on the interpretation of habitual
residence, and that minimal case law existed on the Hague Convention at all.45 The Sixth Circuit
posited that habitual residence should not be mistaken for domicile,46 and formulated its own
standard to determine the habitual residence, stating, “the court must focus on the child, not the
parents, and examine past experience, not future intentions.”47 The court explained that a child
can have only one habitual residence, and it was imperative for courts to look back in time rather
than forward.48
Because it is natural that a family may choose to relocate over the course of a child’s life,
the Sixth Circuit elaborated on what should be considered when deciding whether a child’s
42

Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1398.
Thomas was 21 months old when Mr. Friedrich filed the action alleging that Mrs. Friedrich wrongfully removed
him from Germany. See id.
44
Id. at 1400.
45
Id. at 1400–01.
46
The court noted that while common law domicile is more of a technical term of art, habitual residence is a factual
determination that looks to the individual facts and circumstances of each situation without relying on presuppositions. See Id. at 1401.
47
Id.
48
Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401.
43
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habitual residence has changed. 49 The court asserted that habitual residence can only be
modified by a change in geography and the passage of time, and not by changes in parental care
and responsibility. 50 The court stressed that the requisite change in geography had to occur
before the alleged unlawful removal in order to be given any effect. 51 To hold otherwise or to
focus the inquiry solely on the parental perspective would enable parents to abduct their children
and later characterize their wrongful removals as changes in habitual residence. 52 Such a
standard would render the Hague Convention virtually meaningless.53 As other circuits have
noted, this idea highlights the court’s emphasis on the importance of the child’s point of view,
clearly establishing that “the Sixth Circuit focuses on habitual residence from the child’s
perspective, downplaying parental intent.”54
When applying its new standard to the facts of the case, the Sixth Circuit found that the
factors listed by Mrs. Friedrich pertained to her plans for the future, and disregarded Thomas’s
point of view.55 Mrs. Friedrich argued that although Thomas’s ordinary residence was always in
Germany, Thomas was a habitual resident of the United States because he possessed United
States citizenship—the address for his United States documentation was listed as Ohio—and
Mrs. Friedrich eventually intended to return, with Thomas, to the United States.56 The court
reasoned that it was erroneous to rely on factors that solely reflected the intention of Mrs.
Friedrich, when it is the perspective of the child that is significant.57 The court stated that even
though Mrs. Friedrich established a connection between Thomas and the United States, and may

49

Id. at 1401–02.
Id. at 1402.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Redmond, 724 F.3d at 744.
55
Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401.
56
Id.
57
Id.
50
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have intended for Thomas to move there at some point in the future, Thomas was born in and
resided solely in Germany for his entire life.58 Therefore, any future plans to reside in the United
States were immaterial to the habitual residence inquiry.59 Deeming it a “simple case,” the Sixth
Circuit held that because Thomas was born in Germany and lived there for his entire life before
his mother took him to the United States, Germany was Thomas’s habitual residence at the time
of his removal. Consequently, the court ordered Thomas’s return to Germany for the resolution
of the custody dispute under German law.60
In 1995, the Third Circuit faced the same issue of determining a standard for interpreting
habitual residence in Feder v. Evans-Feder.61 Feder involved Edward M. Feder and Melissa
Ann Evans-Feder, two American citizens who met in Germany in 1987 and whose son, Evan,
was born in Germany in 1990.62 The family moved several times; first to Pennsylvania in 1990,
then to Australia in January 1994.63 Shortly thereafter, the couple’s relationship deteriorated.64
Mrs. Feder decided she wanted to leave Mr. Feder and return to the United States with Evan, so
she told Mr. Feder that she wished to take Evan to visit her parents in Pennsylvania. 65 On June
29, 1994, Mrs. Feder took Evan to the United States and never returned to Australia.66 Mr. Feder
alleged that Mrs. Feder had wrongfully retained their son in the United States and demanded that

58

Id.
Id.
60
Pursuant to Hague Convention, art. 3, 19 I.L.M. at 1501, whether a parent was exercising lawful custody rights
over a child at the time of removal must be determined under the law of the child’s habitual residence.
61
63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995).
62
Id. at 218.
63
Id. at 219.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 219–20.
66
Id. at 220.
59
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Evan be returned to Australia.67 The district court concluded that the United States was Evan’s
habitual residence.68
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, looking to the minimal precedent to hold that a
child’s habitual residence is where he or she has been physically present for a period of time
sufficient for acclimatization and perceives a “degree of settled purpose.”69 The court further
reasoned that when determining what satisfies this standard, the court must engage in an analysis
focusing on the child and analyzing the child’s circumstances, coupled with the parents’ present,
shared intentions.70
When applying this standard to the facts of the case, the Third Circuit concluded that
Australia was Evan’s habitual residence immediately prior to his removal to the United States by
his mother.71 Evan remained in Australia for close to six months prior to the removal, and the
court viewed this as a meaningful amount of time for a four-year old child.72 He attended preschool in Australia and was enrolled in kindergarten for the coming year.73
The court noted that although Mr. and Mrs. Feder differed on their opinions regarding
living in Australia, they still clearly set out to make a new home for themselves and their family
there. 74 They bought a new house, pursued employment, and organized Evan’s long-term
schooling. 75 The court asserted that the fact that “Mrs. Feder did not intend to remain in
Australia permanently and believed that she would leave if her marriage did not improve does
not void the couple’s settled purpose to live as a family in the place where Mr. Feder had found

67

Feder, 63 F.3d at 220.
Id. at 224.
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Feder, 63 F.3d at 224.
75
Id.
68
69
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work.”76 This conclusion highlights the Third Circuit’s emphasis on the principles announced in
Friedrich regarding the downplaying of parental intent and the concept that courts should look to
the past rather than the future when attempting to ascertain habitual residence. The court deemed
the fact that Mrs. Feder did not intend to remain in Australia irrelevant. 77 It was more important
that Evan lived in Australia for the period leading up to his “removal,” rather than where Evan
would live, or where Mrs. Feder intended Evan to live, in the future.
Although the Feder court’s analysis did consider the parents’ actions, the crux of the
inquiry still focused on the child’s perspective. While it gave more weight to the parent’s settled
purpose than the Sixth Circuit did in Friedrich, the Third Circuit gave significantly more weight
to Evan’s perspective, and concluded he was physically present for a sufficient amount of time to
become acclimatized with his situation in Australia, thus achieving an adequate “degree of
settled purpose” from his perspective.78
In explaining its holding, the appellate panel discussed its disagreement with the district
court’s opinion which held that the United States was Evan’s habitual residence. 79 The Third
Circuit found that the district court placed unnecessary emphasis on the fact that Evan had spent
the majority of his life in the United States, and ignored the circumstances of his life in Australia
leading up to the alleged wrongful removal.80
While Feder seems to conflict with the holding of Friedrich, in which the Sixth Circuit
focused on the fact that the child spent his entire life in Germany, the cases can certainly be
factually distinguished. While a child can only have one habitual residence at a particular
instance, habitual residence can change over time depending on a family’s individual
76

See Id.
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
77
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circumstance.81 Habitual residence can be altered by change in geography, and when a child
relocates, they re-start the “acclimatization” process. 82 Thus, what matters is not necessarily
where the child spent the majority of his or her life, but rather, the last place in which the child
spent enough time and would consider herself, from her perspective, settled in that place. While
the Third and Sixth Circuits do not share an identical standard for determining habitual
residence, they do share a commitment to placing significantly more weight on the child’s
perspectives and the past, rather than the parent’s intentions and the future.
In 2010, the Eighth Circuit similarly struggled when determining the standard to apply
when deciding a child’s habitual residence in Barzilay v. Barzilay. 83 Sagi Barzilay appealed
from the district court’s dismissal of his petition claiming that his former wife, Tamar,
unlawfully retained their three children in Missouri and sought an order compelling their
relocation to Israel.84 Sagi and Tamar were Israeli citizens who were married in Israel in 1994
and bore three children.85 The oldest child, an Israeli citizen, was born in Israel and the other
two children, holding dual American and Israeli citizenship, were born in Missouri.86 In 2001,
Sagi and Tamar obtained American work visas and moved from the Netherlands, where they had
lived for approximately two years, to Missouri.87 Tamar and the children had lived in Missouri
since 2001 up until the court proceedings.88 The oldest child had not lived in Israel since her
early youth, and the other two children had never lived there. 89 The district court found that the

81

See Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2010).
Id.
83
See Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2010).
84
Id. at 914.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Barzilay, 600 F.3d at 914.
89
Id. at 914–15.
82
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children’s country of habitual residence was the United States because they had lived in Missouri
for about five years prior to the commencement of the wrongful retention action.90
The Eighth Circuit articulated that the first step in Hague Convention cases is to
determine when the alleged wrongful removal or retention took place, because in determining
habitual residence, the significant time to analyze is immediately before the removal or
retention.91 The court then highlighted several factors set out by the district court which are
relevant to the habitual residence inquiry including “the settled purpose of the move to the new
country from the child’s perspective, parental intent regarding the move, the change in
geography, the passage of time, and the acclimatization of the child to the new country.” 92 The
court elaborated on these elements, noting that the settled purpose does not mean that the
individuals will stay in a new location forever, but the family must have a “sufficient degree of
continuity to be properly described as settled.” 93 Moreover, the settled purpose should be
discerned from the child’s perspective, although parental intent should also be considered. 94 The
court reiterated the analysis of the district court and agreed with its conclusion that the children’s
place of habitual residence was the United States.95 The district court had found that, because
two of the children lived in Missouri for their entire lives—the oldest had lived there for five
years—and there was no suggestion in the record that the children had spent any considerable
amount of time in another country, from the children’s perspective the “settled purpose of the
family’s residence in Missouri was to remain there permanently.”96 While noting that parental
intent was ambiguous in this case, the district court decided that Sagi and Tamar had abandoned
90

Id. at 917–18.
Id. at 918.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Barzilay, 600 F.3d at 918.
95
Id.
96
Id.
91
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their previous habitual residence when they moved to Missouri and planned to remain there
indefinitely.97
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and held that the children were
sufficiently acclimatized to life in the United States.98 The court explained that the oldest child
was the only one who experienced a substantial change in geography, and by 2006 she had spent
approximately five years—half of her life—in the United States.99 Furthermore, the two younger
children had lived in Missouri for their entire lives.100 The court also gave considerable weight
to the fact that the children attended school in United States, and had never attended to school in
Israel.101 The Eighth Circuit agreed that, under the Hague Convention, the children’s country of
habitual residence was the United States. 102 There was no evidence demonstrating that the
children spent any meaningful amount of time outside of the United States since 2001, or that
they had reason to believe that their home was a place other than Missouri.103 In so holding, the
Eighth Circuit focused on the children’s perspective, giving considerable weight to which
country the children would view as their home.
B. The Second and Ninth Circuits: The Parents’ Shared Intent
Although a majority of circuit courts that have addressed the issue have found that
focusing on the child’s perspective in habitual residence determinations most effectively fulfills
the purpose of the Hague Convention, some courts have stressed the importance of focusing on
the parents’ perspective.

These circuits apply a standard that solely examines the shared

intentions of the parents or others entitled to fix the child’s residence when determining which
97

Barzilay, 600 F.3d at 918.
Id. at 919.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Barzilay, 600 F.3d at 918.
103
Id.
98
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country is the child’s habitual residence. These cases highlight the notion that focusing on the
parents’ shared intent is inevitable because children lack the wherewithal to decide where they
want to reside.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mozes v. Mozes is the leading case that focuses on the
parents’ perspective in determining a child’s habitual residence.104 Arnon and Michal Mozes
were Israeli citizens who were married in 1982 and had four children between the ages of seven
and sixteen at the time of the disputed removal.105 The family lived in Israel until 1997, when
Michal and the children moved to Los Angeles, California, with Arnon’s consent.106 The parents
agreed that the children would benefit from attending school in the United States, so Michal
moved with the children to Beverly Hills, where she leased a home, bought automobiles and
registered the children for school.107 While Arnon and Michal conceded that Arnon agreed to
have Michal and the children remain in the United States for fifteen months, they disagreed as to
what arrangement existed beyond that.108 A year after they settled in the United States, Michal
sought dissolution of the marriage and custody of the children.109 Arnon then filed a petition
seeking to have the children returned to Israel, claiming that Michal wrongfully retained the
children in the United States when she sought dissolution of the marriage and custody of the
children.110 The oldest child elected to return to Israel voluntarily111, and Arnon appealed the
district court’s denial of his petition with regard to the three other children.112

104

Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001).
Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1069.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
“The oldest child elected to return to Israel, and did so by mutual agreement of the parents.” See Mozes, 239 F.3d
at 1069.
112
Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1069.
105
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The court posed the question of whose settled intention dictates whether a child has
deserted a prior habitual residence, and asserted that while the intuitive answer would be the
child, this approach is flawed.113 The court asserted that there is an “obvious problem” with
focusing on the child’s perspective and disregarding parental intent. 114 The court noted that
children often lack the wherewithal to determine where they will reside. 115 The court thus
concluded that “the intention or purpose which has to be taken into account is that of the person
or persons entitled to fix the place of the child’s residence.”116 When parents jointly plan to raise
a child in a place and live there, that place becomes the child’s habitual residence.117 The court
determined that a child’s country of habitual residence could ultimately change if the parents
mutually decide to abandon one habitual residence in favor of another. 118 However, the
unilateral intention of only one parent is insufficient to establish a new habitual residence for a
child.119
The court explained that even though children can be exceptionally adaptable and form
strong attachments in short periods of time, it does not necessarily follow that the child expects
or intends those relationships to last.120 The court further reasoned that children may participate
in activities of daily life and still retain awareness that they have another life to go back to. 121
The Ninth Circuit asserted that appropriate inquiry was not solely whether the children had
become settled in the United States, but whether the United States had replaced Israel as the
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center of the children’s familial and social development.”122 Because the district court failed to
answer this question, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case.123
It is important to note that the court acknowledged that a difficulty arises “when the
persons entitled to fix the child’s residence no longer agree on where it has been fixed.” 124 Thus,
the court, which focused on the parents’ intent, implicitly recognized a significant flaw in its own
analysis. The court attempted to address this issue by dividing these situations into three
categories.125 The first includes cases where the family demonstrated a settled purpose to alter
habitual residence even though one parent had reservations about the move.126 The court stated
that in these situations, one parent’s qualms about moving would not prevent a finding of a
shared and settled purpose.127 The second category includes cases where the child’s move from
an established habitual residence was intended to be only for a limited period.128 The court noted
that in these situations, the changed intentions of one parent does not lead to an alteration of the
child’s habitual residence.129 The third category consists of cases where the petitioning parent
had previously agreed to let the child remain abroad for an uncertain duration.130 The court stated
that sometimes the court will infer a mutual abandonment of the child’s previous habitual
resident, and sometimes the court will not be able to recognize a settled mutual intent from
which abandonment can be presumed.131
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Gitter v. Gitter, 132 out of the Second Circuit, also formulated a habitual residence
standard emphasizing a focus on the parents’ intentions. Gitter involved two individuals born in
Israel, who later met in New York, married, and had a son, Eden.133 After Eden’s birth, Mr.
Gitter wanted to move to Israel, and although Mrs. Gitter was hesitant, she was ultimately
convinced.134 About a year after the family had moved, Mrs. Gitter took their son on a trip to
New York and never returned to Israel.135 Mr. Gitter filed a petition seeking Eden’s return to
Israel under the Hague Convention.136
In reviewing Mr. Gitter’s petition, the Second Circuit was greatly influenced by the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Mozes. The court reiterated the “importance of intentions (normally the
shared intentions of the parents or others entitled to fix the child’s residence) in determining a
child’s habitual residence.”137 The court elaborated on the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that merely
observing the child’s behavior was a defective approach because it may produce remarkably
different results depending on the time frame.138 For these reasons, the court concluded that it
would specifically focus on the intent of those entitled to decide the place of the child’s
residence, which are likely to be the parents.139
When examining the pertinent facts, the Second Circuit looked to whether Mr. and Mrs.
Gitter shared the intent that Israel would remain Eden’s habitual residence.140 The court agreed
with the district court in finding that Mr. and Mrs. Gitter only agreed to move to Israel on a
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conditional basis.141 Concluding that Mr. and Mrs. Gitter did not intend for Israel to be Eden’s
habitual residence, and taking into account the fact that the district court was unaware of the
proper legal standard, the court remanded the case so that the district court could view the facts
in light of the opinion.142
The Second Circuit acknowledged that because the Hague Convention is focused on the
habitual residence of the child, it would appear logical to focus on the child’s intentions.143
However, weary of the fact that young children often lack the capacity to decide where they will
reside, the court followed Mozes and agreed “it is more useful to focus on the intent of the
child’s parents or others who may fix the child’s residence.”144
Redmond v. Redmond, one of the most recent cases addressing the standard for
determining habitual residence, recognized the magnitude of the circuit split regarding the
standard that should be used in determining habitual residence.145 The court did not follow any
of the other circuits’ approaches, and noted that it was imprudent to set the relative weights of
parental intent and the child’s perspective in stone.146 The court posited, “the habitual residence
inquiry remains essentially fact-bound, practical, and unencumbered with rigid rules, formulas,
or presumptions.”147 The Seventh Circuit failed to set forth a structured standard, and did not
resolve how to balance the parents’ and child’s perspectives, inadvertently deepening the divide.
Part V: Eliminating the Divide: A Hybrid Subjective and Objective Reasonable Person
Standard Focusing on the Child’s Perspective
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This part argues that it is necessary for courts to follow a uniform approach when
deciding a child’s habitual residence, focusing on the perspective of the child rather than the
parents, and examining past experiences rather than future intentions. It proposes a hybrid
subjective and objective standard concentrating on which country a reasonable person in the
particular situation would view as his or her country of habitual residence. The federal circuit
courts remain divided regarding what the standard for determining habitual residence should be.
While the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have shaped a standard that focuses on the child’s
perspective, the Second and Ninth Circuits have formulated a standard that emphasizes the
parents’ last shared intentions. 148 Congress itself has emphasized “the need for uniform
international interpretation of the Convention.”149
It is vitally important for the Supreme Court to step in to resolve the existing split and
provide a uniform standard. Clarity and uniformity is particularly essential when dealing with
jurisdictional and international disputes. 150 The Hague Convention is designed to address
international adjudications by foreign nations that inherently possess materially dissimilar legal,
cultural, and social systems.

These grave differences demonstrate that a fixed standard is

necessary to properly regulate enforcement.

Lack of consistency also complicates the

enforcement process by decreasing the certainty of the outcome and becoming an unnecessarily
lengthy process, which can be detrimental to the child involved.151
Courts are inconsistently enforcing individuals’ rights due to the variation of habitual
residence standards employed within the federal circuits. The Ninth Circuit holds that courts
148
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should focus on the parents’ shared intent because children lack the wherewithal to decide where
they want to reside.152 However, this approach is flawed because parents often disagree as to
their last shared intent in Hague Convention cases, leaving the courts with an ill-suited standard.
The Third Circuit holds that “a child’s habitual residence is the place where he or she has been
physically present for an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a ‘degree
of settled purpose’ from the child’s perspective.” 153 Nevertheless, case law has failed to
determine what exactly is an appropriate amount of time sufficient for acclimatization.154 The
Eighth Circuit characterizes its habitual residence test as the location where a family possesses “a
sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled.” 155 However, there is a
shortage of guidance regarding what constitutes a “sufficient degree.” These inconsistencies
further strengthen the necessity for a uniform standard.
The goal of the Hague Convention is to maintain the status quo as well as protect the best
interests of the child.156 What a parent may have “hoped” for a child is irrelevant to what the
child actually experienced. Because the Hague Convention is concerned with a child’s habitual
residence, it is only logical that the child’s perspective of habitual residence should be the only
perspective considered. This standard most closely relates to the principles set forth by the Sixth
Circuit in Friedrich, which found that “to determine the habitual residence, the court must focus
on the child, not the parents, and examine past experience, not future intentions.”157 Ordering a
return remedy under the Hague Convention enables the courts of the home country to determine
what is in the child’s best interests, and should focus on the child’s experience and perspective.
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An appropriate approach would be a hybrid subjective and objective standard focusing on
which country a reasonable person in the situation would view as their country of habitual
residence. This subjective component will enable a court to consider the child’s age, capacity,
and maturity, and the objective component will allow a court to consider a child’s perspective,
from a reasonable person in that situation’s point of view.158 A child who spends their entire life
in country A and never lived in country B would likely view country A as their habitual
residence. In this situation, even if a parents intended for country B to be the child’s habitual
residence, it would undeniably serve the best interests of the child to remain in country A.159
This standard is reconcilable with Friedrich, emphasizing both the child’s perspective and past
experiences. It is imperative that courts focus on what the child actually experienced, rather than
what the parents intended for the child to experience because it is the most efficient way to
satisfy the goals of the Hague Convention, which aims to protect the best interests of the child.160
The Second and Ninth Circuits161 misconstrue the standard set out by those courts that
emphasize the child-centric approach. The courts that focus on the child’s perspective do not
suggest that in order to determine habitual residence courts must look at where the child
perceived he or she would reside in the future. Rather, these courts analyze, from the child’s
point of view, the place in which they spent considerable time before the alleged wrongful
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removal and would consider themselves settled.162 The Second and Ninth Circuits mistakenly
focus on future intentions rather than past reality. When a couple first has a child, they can
intend to raise that child in any place they choose.

However, when determining habitual

residence, this intent is irrelevant if the child establishes a settled lifestyle in a completely
different place. The Second and Ninth Circuit cases illustrate that focusing on the parents’ last
shared intent leads to inconsistent outcomes and do not enable courts to make decisions in the
best interests of the child.
The Ninth Circuit163 alleges that children lack the wherewithal to decide where they will
reside, but this claim is misguided. The habitual residence inquiry is more concerned with where
a child has been in the past, and where they were settled leading up the alleged wrongful
removal. The proposed standard can apply to very young children without any problem, and the
way in which the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”)
defines “home state” is particularly instructive when determining a child’s habitual residence
under the Hague Convention.

The UCCJEA is a Uniform Act drafted by the National

Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1997.164 The UCCJEA was drafted to
achieve uniformity in state laws regarding jurisdiction and custody matters in order to avoid
disputes between competing jurisdictions. 165

The UCCJEA’s primary purpose is to vest

“exclusive and continuing jurisdiction” for child custody litigation in the courts of the child’s
“home state.”166
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The UCCJEA and the Hague Convention are comparable because both “provide for a
reasoned determination of where jurisdiction over a custody dispute is properly placed,” and do
so from the child’s perspective.167 The UCCJEA defines “home state” as the state where the
child has lived with a parent for six continuous months prior to the commencement of the
proceeding, or since birth for children younger than six months.168 If the child has not lived in
any state for at least six consecutive months, the court will look to see which state has
“significant connections” with the child and at least one parent and “substantial evidence
concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships.”169 Once a court has
selected an appropriate “home state,” that state may assume child-custody jurisdiction.170 The
“home state” determination thus focuses on the child and where they have spent the majority of
his or her life, rather than any shared intention the parents may have had. It is clear that the home
state determination is an approach from the child’s perspective, specifically because the state
must have significant connections with the child and at least one parent—but not both parents.
Additionally, the court applying the UCCJEA is interested in the substantial evidence regarding
the child’s “care, protection, training, and personal relationships” rather then the parental intent
for any of these factors. The UCCJEA’s determination of home state suggests that the child’s
perspective, regardless of age, trumps parental intent, and that past experiences take precedence
over future intentions.
In Delvoye v. Lee,171 the Third Circuit addressed the Ninth Circuit’s claim that a childcentric approach is problematic because young children are not capable of possessing a
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perspective. The case involved a habitual residence determination for a 2-month-old baby.172
The court noted that an infant’s habitual residence is not necessarily the habitual residence of the
parents, and emphasized that a young child “will normally have no habitual residence until living
in a country on a footing of some stability.” 173 What this demonstrates is that even for the
youngest children, habitual residence must be viewed from the child’s perspective. 174 Focusing
on the parents in any capacity is insufficient to deem that place the child’s habitual residence
because courts must look at the circumstances of the child to determine the country that served as
the focal point of the child’s lifestyle and social development, even if that consists of a short
period of time. The Third and Eighth Circuits have stated that in no way does an infant’s
habitual residence automatically become that of its mother.175 It would be inconsistent with the
Hague Convention to derive a child’s habitual residence from its mother, because it would
“create an impermissible presumption that the child’s habitual residence is wherever the mother
happens to be.”176
This proposed standard focusing on the child is further bolstered by several inherent
weaknesses of any approach focusing on parental intent. In Gitter the Second Circuit stated: “In
the easy case, the parents (or others entitled to determine the child's residence) will agree on
where the child's habitual residence is fixed, and we are likely to conclude that the child's
habitual residence is as intended.”177 However, at the same time the court recognized that “in
nearly all of the cases that arise under the Convention, however, the parents have come to

172

Id. at 333.
Id.
174
See Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 746 (7th Cir. 2003). (noting that although the child was only 8 months
old, habitual residence should be determined from the child’s perspective).
175
See Delvoye, 329 F.3d at 333; Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir.1995).
176 Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d at 379.
177
Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 2005).
173

25

disagree as to the place of the child’s habitual residence.178 This explicit acknowledgement of
the tension inherent in its own approach demonstrates the significant problem, at the outset, with
focusing on parental intent because there is most likely a disagreement over which country the
parents intended as the child’s habitual residence. Another unavoidable flaw in following the
Second and Ninth Circuit’s approach is that an emphasis on shared parental intent does not work
when the parents are estranged essentially from the outset.179 The majority of Hague Convention
cases involve parents who are estranged. 180 An obvious problem in such disputes is that the
parents often possess different intentions for the habitual residence of their child in common.
These inconsistent solutions to various situations demonstrate that focusing on the parent’s last
shared intent is not an effective method because it proves to be erratic and unpredictable.
VI.

Conclusion
Since the adoption of The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child

Abduction in 1980, courts have struggled to set forth a standard to determine a child’s habitual
residence. Lack of guidance from the Hague Convention itself has forced the federal circuit
courts to shape their own standards, leading to erratic application of the Hague Convention and
unpredictable outcomes in the respective proceedings. The Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits
have constructed a standard that focuses on the child’s perspective while the Second and Ninth
Circuits have formulated a standard that emphasizes the parents’ last shared intentions. In a
Hague Convention proceeding, courts should conduct a hybrid subjective and objective
reasonable person test focusing solely on the child’s perspective, which looks to past experience.
Any analysis to the contrary—which focuses on parents’ shared intent—is flawed in numerous
significant ways. Hague Convention proceedings primarily arise when parents no longer agree
178
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on the child’s habitual residence. Additionally, Hague Convention cases often involve estranged
parents. To focus on the perspectives of people involved in this sort of dynamic is ineffective
and disadvantageous. It is unfitting to focus on the parents’ perspective when it is the child’s
habitual residence that must be determined. A uniform standard is imperative in order for the
Hague Convention’s purposes to be properly fulfilled, and courts should adopt a hybrid
subjective and objective reasonable person standard focusing on the child’s perspective and past
experience.
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